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Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009;
2011) hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. If this thesis is correct, then we should
expect the defeasibility conditions for knowledge-how and knowledge-that to be uniform—viz., that the
mechanisms of epistemic defeat which undermine propositional knowledge will be equally capable of
imperilling knowledge-how. The goal of this paper is twofold: ﬁrst, against intellectualism, we will show
that knowledge-how is in fact resilient to being undermined by the very kinds of traditional (proposi-
tional) epistemic defeaters which clearly defeat the items of propositional knowledge which intellectualists
identify with knowledge-how. Second, we aim to ﬁll an important lacuna in the contemporary debate,
which is to develop an alternative way in which epistemic defeat for knowledge-how could be modelled
within an anti-intellectualist framework.
1. Propositional Knowledge and Epistemic Defeat
It is ubiquitous in mainstream epistemology to theorize about what properties should be
regarded as upgrading epistemic status. For instance, we evaluate beliefs positively from
an epistemic point of view in light of their being supported by evidence, issued by a reli-
able source, responsibly held, safe, sensitive, etc.1 Unsurprisingly, we are also interested
in what might cause a belief to lose positive epistemic status. Defeasibiliy, as Michael
Sudduth (2008) puts it, refers to a ‘belief’s liability to lose some positive epistemic sta-
tus, or to having this status downgraded in some particular way.’2 There are various
ways this can happen, and accordingly, various kinds of epistemic defeaters, viz., where
an ‘epistemic defeater’ is shorthand for: some condition which actualizes the potential of
an epistemic state to be downgraded in status.
1 For discussion on the kinds of considerations which frame evaluation from an epistemic point of view,
see, for example, Alston (2005); Goldman (1999) and Sosa (1991).
2 Just as knowledge asymmetrically entails epistemic justiﬁcation, so correlatively, if the obtaining of some
condition defeats the status of a belief as epistemically justiﬁed, this asymmetrically entails the defeat of
the status of that belief as knowledge.
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The simple picture of epistemic defeat that is standard in contemporary literature (e.g.,
Pollock and Cruz 19863) is one in which the nature of epistemic defeaters is propositional
in character, and mostly applied to cases of so-called ‘knowledge-that’ (typically, by under-
mining the justiﬁcation component of knowledge-that). On this traditional picture, both
what is defeated (the piece of presumed knowledge) as well as what produces the defeat
(the defeater itself) are propositional states related by their truth conditions. On this assump-
tion, the standard model makes (at least) two fundamental distinctions. According to the
ﬁrst one, defeaters may be psychological or normative, depending on whether the potential
of an epistemic state to be downgraded is actualised (i) in virtue of some belief that is actu-
ally being held by the agent (in the case of psychological defeaters), or (2) in virtue of some
belief that the agent should have (in the case of normative defeaters).4 According to the sec-
ond distinction (e.g., Pollock & Cruz 1986, 193), the defeater may either operate by rebut-
ting or by undercutting a the knowledge/justiﬁcation of a belief, depending on whether (i) it
furnishes new evidence against the target belief (in the case of rebutting defeaters) or (2) it
undermines the evidence the agent had in its favour (in the case of undercutting defeaters).5
Some brief examples will be helpful here. Let’s consider, ﬁrst, psychological defeaters,
alternatively known as mental-state defeaters, which are doubts or beliefs which, when they
defeat propositional knowledge, they do so in virtue of simply being had, regardless of
whether they are true, justiﬁed, etc. For example, to use a straightforward case from Pollock
& Cruz (1986, 43), suppose you see a book that appears red and accordingly judge that it is
red. Someone then tells you that it is in fact not red, and you trust their word. In such a case,
regardless of whether this person is lying to you, in such a circumstance, you acquire a psy-
chological defeater of what Pollock & Cruz call a rebutting variety; your justiﬁcation/knowl-
edge for your belief that the book is red is defeated by the new belief you acquire (that it is
not red) speciﬁcally by counting against the truth (i.e., by rebutting) of the target proposition.
Psychological defeaters can also defeat propositional knowledge in a way that is under-
cutting rather than rebutting—viz., by indicating that the agent’s belief that p was unreliably
or otherwise defectively formed. Pollock and Cruz offer an undercutting variation on the red
book case as follows: just suppose you believe you’re looking at a red book but then come
to hear not that the book is not red, but rather, that there is red lighting in the room. This new
information causes you to doubt that the way you formed the believe (i.e., via perception in
a local environment with distorted light) will likely give you a true belief on this occasion.
Normative defeaters (e.g., Lackey 2014, 292) by contrast with psychological defeaters,
are those doubts and beliefs that defeat propositional justiﬁcation/knowledge in virtue of
being beliefs which one (epistemically) should have (whether or not one does have them),
and which either count against the truth of the target proposition, in the rebutting case, or
against the reliability of the formation of the target proposition, in the undercutting case.6
3 For an early presentation of this kind of distinction, see Pollock (1970).
4 We are here following Lackey’s latest formulation (2014, 292), which differs from her own earlier termi-
nology (1999; 2005). Note that some philosophers refer to normative defeaters, in Lackey’s sense, as
propositional defeaters. We are, however, following Lackey in reserving ‘propositional’ in this paper to
pick out the wider system of epistemic defeat which encompasses both psychological (i.e., mental state)
and normative defeaters. As will be relevant for our purposes, these are propositions which one does
belief, and propositions which one should believe.
5 Pollock & Cruz (1986, 196). See here also Bergmann (1997; 2005).
6 For a helpful recent discussion of the epistemic ‘should’ in cases where we claim an agent should (epis-
temically) have believed something or known something, see Goldberg (2015). Cf. Chrisman (2008).
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To illustrate normative (i.e., non-psychological) defeat, we can simply run some varia-
tions on Pollock & Cruz’s red book case. Just suppose that, after the individual tells you
that the book is not red, you stubbornly continue to believe that it is red, despite suppos-
ing that the individual who told you this was a very reliable source. Here, you don’t ac-
tually acquire a belief that the book is not red, so you do not uptake any propositional
attitude that indicates the target proposition is false. But, in this case, there is a belief
(viz., that the book is not red) you (epistemically) should have such that, if you had it, it
would count against the truth of the target proposition. This is a normative rebutting
defeater. By contrast, an undercutting normative defeater by contrast is a belief you epis-
temically should have which counts against the reliability of the formation of the target
belief; for example, if you are told by a reliable source that there is red lighting in the
room, but continue to believe nonetheless that the book is red, you will have acquired a
normative undercutting defeater for the target proposition.
There are of course many aspects of defeasibility that aren’t settled,7 though the above
picture captures, in ways that are largely orthodox and uncontentious, how propositional
knowledge might be downgraded in epistemic status through ordinary mechanisms of epis-
temic defeat. With this simple picture in mind, let’s now move to the speciﬁc issue of how
knowledge-how might subject to being downgraded in epistemic status.
2. Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism
The idea that knowing-how and knowing-that are different kinds of epistemic states had
been widely undisputed since Gilbert Ryle (1946; 1949) made this distinction explicit in
the mid-twentieth century. Ryle called ‘intellectualism’ the attempt to consider that know-
ing how to φ consists in knowing that something is the case, and he claimed that such a
view was doomed to fail, since it would be committed either to an inﬁnite regress or to
the postulation of impossible mediators between theory and practice.8
In contrast to the intellectualist’s identiﬁcation of knowing-how with knowing-that, Ryle
insisted that knowing-how has much more to do with our abilities and capacities than with the
grasping of true propositions, and that, in essence, knowing-how was not a propositional state.
Knowing-how to φ, according to Ryle’s perspective, is not principally a matter of grasping
truths about the practice of φ-ing, but a matter of having the power to φ, the skill to φ well,
the ability to achieve success in φ-ing in the relevant circumstances, all of which are issues
related to what we are able to do, and not of what propositional attitudes we endorse.9
Ryle’s distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that was more or less uncritically
accepted within mainstream epistemology prior to Stanley & Williamson’s (2001) inﬂuen-
tial attempt to motivate intellectualism on linguistic grounds. Stanley & Williamson
attempted to show in particular that knowing-how to φ is, like knowing-what, knowing-
when, or knowing-why, just a matter of knowing a fact, and is thus a case of propositional
knowledge. Take, for example, knowing-how to ride a bike. As Stanley puts it,
7 See Sudduth (2008).
8 See Stanley (2011, Ch. 1) for a recent critical discussion of Ryle’s anti-intellectualist argument from
regress. Cf., Cath (2013), Hornsby (2011) and Navarro (under review) for criticism of Stanley’s interpre-
tation of Ryle.
9 The issue of whether Ryle held himself a positive view that may be labelled as “anti-intellectualism”,
according to which states of know-how just are abilities is controversial—see Hornsby (2011) and
Navarro (under review).
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[. . .] you know how to ride a bicycle if and only if you know in what way you could ride
a bicycle. But you know in what way you could ride a bicycle if and only if you possess
some propositional knowledge, viz. knowing, of a certain way w which is a way in which
you could ride a bicycle, that w is a way in which you could ride a bicycle (2010, 209).
In short, the fact that one knows, when one knows how to φ is, in their view, the answer
to a question: ‘how could you φ?’, and knowing that answer is knowing that there is a
way to φ, call it w, by means of which one would φ successfully if one tried. Knowing-
how, according to this new intellectualist and reductivist trend, may be reduced to a special
case of propositional de se knowledge: knowledge about the way in which one could φ10
—a way that must be grasped under what they call ‘a practical mode of presentation’.11
We should expect that, if Stanley & Williamson were right, and knowledge-how could be
reduced to knowledge-that, it would be subject to the very same mechanisms of epistemic
defeat as knowledge-that, along the lines we have sketched in the previous section. This is a
natural extension of a point which Stanley (2011) himself grants explicitly. As he puts it, “[i]f
knowing-how is a species of knowing that, the properties of knowing-that should be
properties of knowing-how” (2015, 211), and this holds for speciﬁcally epistemological
properties.12
For example, Stanley admits that if Gettier cases can’t be constructed for knowledge-
how, then this would be a mark against intellectualism, given that Gettier cases are
constructible (in the paradigmatic case) for knowledge-that.13 So, just as it would be a
problem for the intellectualist if knowledge-how and knowledge-that differ in their
respective compatibility with Gettier cases, likewise, it would be—by Stanley’s own
10 Note that other forms of intellectualism (i.e., Bengson & Moffett 2011b) have also been proposed, that
do not intend to reduce knowledge-how to propositional states, but they will not be the focus of our
attention here.
11 See Stanley (2011), along with Glick (2015) and Pavese (2015). Anti-intellectualists (e.g., Schiffer 2002;
N€oe 2005; Carter & Pritchard 2015c have in various places expressed dissatisfaction with the elusiveness
of practical modes of presentation. See Pavese (2015) for an alternative construal of practical modes, as a
way of supplementing intellectualism, according to which practical modes are ‘conceptual components of
the propositional content that is putatively known when one knows how to do something’. On Pavese’s
view, knowledge-how is knowledge of what she calls a practical proposition, which has, as a component,
a practical sense (2015, 2).
12 Notice that this is only of application if, following Stanley &Williamson, the intellectualist identiﬁes knowl-
edge-how with garden-variety knowledge-that, which includes many other features besides being proposi-
tional (e.g., being true, justiﬁed, believed by the agent, Gettier-proof, safe, . . . or defeasible in some speciﬁc
ways). There are weaker versions of intellectualism where it would not follow that anything that is a prop-
erty of standard knowledge-that must also be a property of the speciﬁc sort of knowledge-that knowledge-
how is supposed to be reduced to—see for instance Glick (2011), or Cath (2015) (we thank Josh Habgood-
Coote for raising this concern). These other weaker versions of intellectualism are not the target of our argu-
ment here, since they may hold that the kind of knowledge-that which matters in this respect is special in this
particular feature. Nevertheless, even if those views would be unscathed by our argument, they would have
to give additional reasons in order to show that the move is not ad hoc, which we think it is. And, further-
more, such views would have to offer an alternative explanation of the way know-how is actually defeated
when it is, if not by the traditional ways know-that may be defeated. In so far as such proposals have not
been complemented by such explanations, they are in an unfavourable position with respect to anti-intellec-
tualism, which does have such an account—the one we propose in §4.
13 See however Poston (2009), Cath (2011) and Carter and Pritchard (2015a) for arguments according to
which knowledge-how is more resilient to being undermined by epistemic luck than knowledge that.
Likewise, see Poston (Forthcoming) for a different argument against intellectualism on the basis of a dif-
ference in epistemic properties between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. As Poston argues, knowl-
edge-how cannot be transferrable via testimony in the same manner as knowledge-that.
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lights—a problem if knowledge-how and knowledge-that differ in the way that they are
subject to mechanisms of epistemic defeat.
By contrast, the situation would be interestingly different for anti-intellectualism, according
to which knowledge-how is grounded not in one’s propositional attitudes but rather in one’s
ability possession. If knowledge-how is not of a propositional kind, then we may expect it to
behave differently in the face of propositional states that threaten to rebut or undercut it. Fur-
thermore, given that even within an anti-intellectualist framework, we may expect knowl-
edge-how to be defeasible in some sense, the anti-intellectualist would be in need of some
alternative account of what defeaters are for that sui generis kind of epistemic status.
The goal of the rest of this paper is twofold: ﬁrst, against intellectualism, we will
show that knowledge-how behaves differently with respect to traditional propositional
defeaters—which is a motive to believe that such an account is misguided. And second,
we aim to ﬁll an important lacuna in the contemporary debate, which is to point out an
alternative way in which epistemic defeat for knowledge-how could be modelled within
an anti-intellectualist framework. In between, we will offer an explanation for the appeal
the intellectualist account may have had, which in our view is due to the fact that it par-
tially mirrors genuine know-how epistemic defeat.
The next section is devoted to the ﬁrst of these objectives—viz., to show that a strictly
propositional account of epistemic defeat, i.e., where defeaters are understood as beliefs
that one has (in the psychological case) or that one should have (in the normative case)
are unable to account for the way know-how may be defeated. In short, knowledge-how
appears to be immune to the kinds of defeaters which are capable of defeating the items
of knowledge-that which intellectualists identify with knowledge-how.
3. Intellectualism and Epistemic Defeat: Some Counterexamples
Consider the following case.
GRENADE FACTORY: Ana and Marıa work in a grenade factory during the Spanish Civil War.
They are thoroughly instructed when hired, with examples and practical explanations. By
controlled trial and error, they learn their job, and both continue working at the factory for
years, believing they are making working grenades. However, one day each comes to realize
that the other is making grenades in an importantly different way, and they identify the ori-
gin of the problem: as it turns out, the instructions were ambiguous and allowed for two dif-
ferent interpretations. The instructors were not aware of this, and there is nobody above
them now who may say who is right. Given that the grenades may only be used in battle,
which is very far away, neither Ana nor Marıa knows whose grenades actually work, and so
there is no way to ﬁnd out who is making them the right way. As a matter of fact, Ana got
the instructions right (she produces grenades in way w, which is the correct way); she is very
successful in producing grenades that later work perfectly. It is Marıa who got something
wrong (she makes them in w’, the possible interpretation of the instructions that the instruc-
tors did not foresee), and her grenades are always duds. Unaware of this, both have reason-
able doubts they did not have before, but they have to keep on working.
Our intuition is that, in GRENADE FACTORY, we may still say that Ana knows how to make
grenades, whereas Marıa does not.14 However, once acquainted with the fact that Marıa,
14 See here also Cath’s (2011), whose inclination is to attribute know-how in a similar kind of case which
he terms DOGMATIC HALLUCINATOR. We are grateful to a referee at Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research for drawing our attention to this case.
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whom Ana regards as a grenade-making peer, learnt to do them in an importantly differ-
ent way, Ana does not know anymore that w is the right way for her to make the gre-
nades. Ana, by realizing that Marıa learnt to produce the grenades differently than she
did, has now a good reason to suspect that one of the two learning processes went
wrong. That furnishes her with a reasonable doubt that w, the way she actually learnt, is
a way for her to make grenades. Those new doubts then defeat her (would-be) knowl-
edge that w is a way for her to make grenades. Now, though Ana does not know any-
more that w is the right way for her to make grenades, still, her grenades are as
functional as they have always been, which is a good reason to claim that she continues
to know how to make grenades (even if she does not know anymore that she knows how
to make them).
As we’ve detailed the case, GRENADE FACTORY features a defeater that is psychological
in character. Ana’s knowledge that way w is the way for her to make grenades is
defeated by her acquiring the particular belief that she does—viz., that Marıa is making
them a different way—a belief which calls into doubt for her the reliability of her own
method of making grenades. Granted, Ana, in light of acquiring this belief, might well
have lost conﬁdence that she is making the grenades the right way. Her self-esteem may
suffer. However, lack of self-esteem and lack of conﬁdence are perfectly compatible with
knowing how to do the thing in question.15 Provided Ana’s doubts do not affect her abil-
ities (and we will say more on this possibility in the next section), the acquisition of a
psychological defeater for her (would-be) knowledge that w is the way for her to make
grenades is simply not the kind of fact that undermines her know-how.
One natural objection to the GRENADE FACTORY case, as we’ve described it, is that it
trades on a contested premise, namely, what is called in the peer disagreement literature
the conciliatory view (e.g., Elga 2007; Feldman 2007). According to the conciliatory
view, the rational response to discovering that an epistemic peer disagrees with you about
p is to withhold judgment—or, at least, lower your credence—with respect to p. By con-
trast, the steadfast view (e.g., Kelly 2005; 2010; van Inwagen 1996) permits one to
rationally maintain one’s belief in the face of a discovered epistemic peer disagreement.
It might seem superﬁcially that in GRENADE FACTORY, Ana acquires a defeater only if the
conciliatory view is correct, though not if the steadfast view is correct. After all, the
steadfast view permits Ana to rationally continue believing that w is the way to make
grenades, even after discovering that Marıa (whom she regards as a peer) makes them
differently.
This objection, however, is misplaced. GRENADE FACTORY is proposed as a case of psy-
chological defeat, and psychological defeaters defeat knowledge simply in virtue of being
had. Even if the conciliatory view is false, and rationality doesn’t require that Ana with-
hold judgment (or lower her credence) that w is the way for her to make grenades, so
long as she in fact does withhold her judgment—viz., as is described in the case—this
sufﬁces for her to acquire a psychological defeater. In short, psychological defeaters don’t
defeat in virtue of their being rational, per se, but rather, in virtue of being believed and
counting, from the perspective of the agent, against the target belief.16
15 For example, Olympic ski jumpers who perform ﬂawlessly under pressure and who know how to do
some of the most difﬁcult jumps, can often experience self-doubt and a loss of conﬁdence in their abili-
ties prior to competition; this is a normal aspect of human anxiety which needn’t impair performance.
16 See, for example Pollock (1986, 29-30, 37-58).
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We want to now show how a similar point can be made—viz., that epistemic defeaters
which defeat the kind of propositional knowledge intellectualists identify with knowledge
how, are nonetheless compatible with knowledge how—unequivocally in terms of nor-
mative defeat. In order to bring this point out effectively, let’s run a slight variation on
the original GRENADE FACTORY case.
GRENADE FACTORY*: Holding ﬁxed the details of the original GRENADE FACTORY case, we
add a third character, Juana, who has been working in the factory much longer than
Ana and Marıa, and so they both regard Juana as more skilled expert than they at mak-
ing grenades. Juana, Ana and Marıa have all received the same training, but one day
they realize that the instructions were ambiguous, and the instructors were not aware of
this. As a matter of fact, Ana got the instructions right (she produces grenades in way
w, which is the correct way), and she is very successful in producing grenades that later
work perfectly. But Marıa as well as Juana got something wrong (they make them in
way w’), and so their grenades are always duds. Given that the grenades may only be
used in battle, which is very far away, and none of the three are told if their grenades
actually work or not, there is no way for them to ﬁnd out which of them interpreted
the instructions correctly. Ana comes to realize that, of the three workers, only she is
making grenades in way w; but Ana is very stubborn, and that she continues to be con-
vinced that her way is the right one, dismissing the fact that both Marıa, whom she
regards as a peer, and Juana, whom she regards as a superior, learnt to make them a
different way.
There are two key points to glean from this case. Firstly, in the situation so described,
Ana should not continue to believe that w is the way for her to make grenades.17 Doing
so, under the circumstances, would be epistemically irresponsible, irrational, etc. Ana
thus has a textbook normative defeater for her belief that w is a way for her to make gre-
nades. Accordingly, Ana does not know that w is a way for her to make grenades. How-
ever—and this is the second key point—while neither Marıa nor Juana knows how to
make grenades, Ana does.
In both versions of the case we’ve run, the defeaters acquired are undercutting in the
sense that they count against Anna’s having correctly learned how to make the grenades,
but not directly against whether the grenades in fact operate.18 The moral in this respect
is that undercutting defeaters, as we’ve suggested, appeared entirely compatible with
knowledge-how even though they undermine Ana’s knowledge that w is the way for her
to make grenades.
We can make a similar point vis-a-vis rebutting defeat, by simply introducing some-
thing which goes wrong in the feedback process rather than—as in the versions of the
case considered—the learning process. For instance:
GRENADE FACTORY**: All the women in the factory learnt correctly to produce grenades in
the right way, w, and have been producing them for some time. One day, they hear over
a very reliable civilian radio that the regiment to which their grenades were shipped was
soundly defeated due to equipment difﬁculties involving dud grenades. The information
spreads among the women in the factory, and they are no longer conﬁdent that w is a
way for them to make grenades. Nevertheless, unbeknownst to them, the grenades
17 For a related insight, see Cath’s (2011) case DOGMATIC HALLUCINATOR.
18 This would be the case, for example, if they were to receive testimony that the grenades were duds. We
consider this kind of case shortly.
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they produce are perfectly functional and the duds ones were produced in a different
factory.
If the factory workers believed the report, they would acquire a psychological rebutting
defeater for their (would-be) knowledge that w is the way for them to make grenades.
If they didn’t believe the report, then so long as they would have a good reason to
believe that the defective grenades come from their factory, still they should believe it,
and accordingly doubt that they are producing the grenades in the right way. They
would thus acquire a normative rebutting defeater for their (would-be) knowledge that
theirs is the way to make grenades. Still, both psychological and normative rebutting
defeaters can be defeated, as could be the case in GRENADE FACTORY**. After all, una-
ware to them, theirs really is the right way for them to make the grenades, and those
that are defective come from another factory. This new information, should they
acquire it (for example, from a further update over the reliable civilian radio), could
defeat the previous defeater, and restore the piece of knowledge that they are making
the grenades in the right way. Nevertheless, the presence or absence of this defeater-
defeater does not affect their know-how, which was simply preserved, unaffected, even
while they had reasons to doubt that their way was the right way to produce the
grenades.
This puts reductive intellectualism in a bad position, indeed. If know-how really were
a case of know-that, we should expect it to be defeasible by the same kinds of mecha-
nisms by which propositional knowledge is defeated. But it is not. In other words: garden
variety defeaters of knowledge-that do defeat the knowledge agents have about the ways
in which they do what they do. When affected by those defeaters, agents do not know
anymore that theirs is the right way to do the activity in question—and, nevertheless,
their knowledge-how remains undefeated. That is the case of Ana in each of the varia-
tions of our GRENADE FACTORY case: in each of those situations Ana still knows how to
make grenades, even if her knowledge-that about her way of doing them is defeated by
different mechanisms.
The claim that Ana preserves her know-how along all the variations of the case is sup-
ported by the fact that she is still able to make grenades proﬁciently, and the doubts she
acquires do not seem to imperil this ability in any relevant sense.19 That affords us a
good reason to think that the Rylean account of know-how is in the right track. However,
we do not want to deny that there is something closely related to that know-how state
that Ana actually lose, and which has some importance: she does not know anymore that
she knows how to make grenades.
The way we see it, Stanley & Williamson’s position would be more promising if it
had a different cognitive phenomenon as its explanandum—viz., the kind of knowledge-
that which we may have about our own know-how—viz., a peculiar kind of proposi-
tional knowledge an agent may have about which is a right way for her to φ, a way of
doing that is grasped under a practical mode of presentation. That state is a peculiar kind
19 The success that she still attains when trying to perform her task intentionally is what supports, we hold,
her know-how, because that is what her know-how consists in, namely, the ability to accomplish her task
in a valuable way, which is something she retains despite the unfavourable circumstances.
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of de se knowledge that we would rather call meta-knowledge about know-how, which
ought not be confused with the know-how itself.20
In sum, Stanley & Williamson’s proposal may help us understand the peculiar nature
of the sort of knowledge-that which we may have about our own knowledge-how—but it
is not well aimed in order to uncover the nature of knowledge-how itself. The important
point then in favour of our proposal is that the intellectualist alternative fails to account
for the cases discussed in this section. That is: there may be know-how even if the agent
has no meta-knowledge about it, which is what our variations of GRENADE FACTORY cases
show.21 That knowledge-how would then be an epistemic state that, not being proposi-
tional, would be immune to propositional defeat.
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether genuine know-how may be susceptible to
being defeated by other sort of mechanisms. We hold that it certainly is, and the rest of
the paper is devoted to showing how this is possible. Our claim in this respect is that
know-how is genuinely defeated at least in some situations where the related ability is
undermined in certain (to-be-speciﬁed) particular ways. If our view is correct, anti-intel-
lectualism may be in a better position to account for how knowledge how is actually
defeated, when it is.
4. Modelling Epistemic Defeat for Anti-Intellectualism
In this section our goal is to show that an anti-intellectualist account of knowledge-how
can succeed where the intellectualist account fails. And we will pursue this goal by
proposing a novel way to model defeaters for knowledge-how within an anti-intellectual-
ist framework. As an initial step, though, we want to note two desiderata that such an
account will need to satisfy. First, in light of the conclusions drawn in §2, such a model
will have to be constructed along different lines than those followed by the traditional
model of epistemic defeat, according to which the relata in epistemic defeat relations are
fundamentally propositional attitudes. In particular, defeat relations for knowledge-how
must not be modelled as relations whereby what is defeated is a justiﬁed belief, and what
does the defeating is a proposition which is, or should be, believed.
This leads to a second, more speciﬁc desideratum. Consider that, on the standard
model of epistemic defeaters for knowledge-that (according to §1), defeaters call into
doubt the status of believed propositions by undercutting their putative justiﬁcation or by
20 If an agent has this sui generis kind of propositional knowledge, then, trivially, she has the ability in
question in the sense we give to the term (that is: she would be able to φ in way w if she tried in the rel-
evant circumstances). In other words: Stanley & Williamson’s knowledge about ways would trivially
implicate know-how, because, if one has such a state, one knows that one knows how to φ, and thus one
knows-how to φ. Just as any other kind of propositional knowledge, Stanley & Williamson’s knowledge
about ways is factive, and implicates the truth of what is known—viz., if it is meta-knowledge, it impli-
cates that one knows how to φ. Glick has already made the claim that Stanley and Williamson’s knowl-
edge about ways may be read as knowledge the agent has of her own abilities: “according to the
standard views in linguistics to which Stanley and Williamson appeal, ‘S knows how to φ’ has an inter-
pretation on which it means that S knows something like that he can φ in way w, and hence entails that
S can φ in way w, and hence entails that S can φ” (2012, 137). The suggestion we are making here is
stronger, in the sense that it would not only be the ability, but the know-how itself, what would be the
object of this kind of de se knowledge.
21 Interestingly enough, the lack of meta-knowledge seems to be more permissible in the case of know-how
than in the case of knowledge-that. That is: nothing seems to be wrong intuitively in an agent knowing
how to φ but not knowing that she knows how to φ, whereas it seems at least disputable that an agent
may know that p but not know that she knows it (see, for instance, D. Greco, 2014).
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rebutting their putative truth. Put more abstractly: epistemic defeaters either target the
warrant of the belief (its justiﬁcation) or its success component (its truth).22 Accordingly,
on a viable anti-intellectualist account of epistemic defeat for know-how, epistemic defea-
ters must target either the warrant status, or the success component, of something else.
In other words, in order to satisfy our ﬁrst desideratum, we have to ﬁnd an alternative
for belief as the state that is defeated, whereas in order to satisfy our second desideratum,
we’ll need to posit different properties of that state as the ones that are defeated, in such
a way that it would allow the anti-intellectualist to formulate distinctions potentially
equivalent to the undercutting/rebutting one.
Accordingly, in order to satisfy the ﬁrst desideratum, what our proposal submits (roughly
for now, and in a way we will continue to reﬁne) is that it is abilities themselves which are
undermined when knowledge-how is defeated, rather than beliefs about those abilities,
beliefs about ways for one to do something, or beliefs about anything else. In short: what
we want to suggest is that it is not a propositional state of the agent, but the ability itself, the
power, the capacity, that is compromised when her knowledge-how is defeated.
But what does it mean to say that an ability may be defeated, and by what mecha-
nisms is that possible? Here it will be helpful to reﬂect on some different ways in which
one is no longer able to do something one was once able to do. To this end, consider the
following two variations on a case:23
CHEF-A: A highly skilled chef becomes afﬂicted with arthritis, after which she can no
longer prepare her signature dish of Anginares a la Polita.
CHEF-B: A highly skilled chef becomes afﬂicted with Alzheimer’s disease, after which she
can no longer prepare her signature dish of Anginares a la Polita.
On an initial ﬁrst pass, it might seem as though we should regard both situations as cases
where the relevant ability (i.e., the ability to make the Anginares a la Polita) is under-
mined and therefore, as cases that equally demonstrate abilities to be defeated. And so,
initially, it might seem as though the answer to the question: ‘How can abilities be
defeated?’, would be: through disabling conditions, such as arthritis or Alzheimer’s.
While this answer is somewhat on the right track, we think it’s too quick, and that it
glosses over an important distinction. Consider, for one thing, that there is something fur-
ther that the chef loses in the case of CHEF-B, which is not lost in the case of CHEF-A, and
correspondingly, something valuable that the chef retains in CHEF-A but not in CHEF-B.
And this is so even though neither chef can make the signature dish anymore.
In CHEF-A, the chef, via the arthritis, clearly loses the opportunity to manifest her abil-
ity, much in the way a pianist who is imprisoned (or, who happens to be underwater)
loses the opportunity to manifest her ability. The new impediment, in this case, affects
the agent’s physiological status, it is true, and it does so in such a way that it could even
be irretrievable. But (to put it simply) all is not lost. The chef in the ﬁrst case is surely
22 According to normativists about belief (e.g., Engel 2004; Shah & Velleman 2007, Shah 2005, Wedgwood
2002), that truth is the epistemic standard of correctness for belief is constitutive of belief—viz., it is part
of what it is to be a belief (as opposed to some other attitude) to have such standard. Though, one
needn’t embrace normativism about belief in order to embrace the weaker platitude that beliefs are cor-
rect if and only if true; or, in slogan form, that beliefs aim at truth.
23 These cases are based on another one originally proposed by Paul Snowdon (2004:8).
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not in the same position as a complete amateur. Put her in the right circumstance—viz.,
where the arthritis subsides—and she can then prepare her signature dish in a way that
manifests her ability.
In CHEF-B, however, things are considerably worse. It seems plausible to regard the
chef, suffering Alzheimer’s disease, as lacking not merely opportunity to exercise her
ability, but the ability itself.24 (Consider: the chef in CHEF-A doesn’t need to re-learn to
do anything; just let the arthritis pain subside; the chef in CHEF-B, however, even if she
were cured from her disease, would be no better off than a beginner. In CHEF-B, in order
to make Anginares a la Polita, the chef with Alzheimer’s disease would need to re-learn
all the steps, and unfortunately in some cases this is simply impossible.)
A lesson to draw from this comparison is that making inaccessible the opportunity
conditions for manifesting an ability needn’t itself defeat the ability in question. Rather,
an ability should be regarded as defeated only if, if the opportunity were suitably present,
the agent would systematically fail—viz., even if she were in the right opportunity condi-
tions to φ, she would not be able anymore to φ if she tried.
Before moving on, let’s brieﬂy take stock. To this point, we’ve suggested that, on any
viable anti-intellectualist account of the defeasibility of knowledge-how, abilities them-
selves (and not propositional attitudes) must stand in defeat relations, and further—with
reference to the above comparison of cases—we’ve distinguished between defeating an
ability simpliciter (as in the case of CHEF-B), and (more weakly) merely preventing an
ability from being manifested (as in the case of CHEF-A), where the latter falls short of
genuinely defeating the ability.25 The moral here was that what matters of the attribution
of an ability is the agent’s capacities to manifest it in the relevant circumstances.26 Not
all cases of disability are then knowledge-undermining but, perhaps, only those that pre-
vent the agent from manifesting the ability in some opportunity circumstances that should
be, in principle, appropriate for that manifestation.27
24 About the distinction between opportunity “can” and ability “can” see Austin (1961, 177), which Glick
(2012, 131) has also applied to the debate on knowledge-how.
25 Intellectualists have claimed that, when the opportunities to exercise the ability are modally far away (as
in CHEF-A, or in the much discussed case of a pianist who loses both hands in a tragic accident), the
agents actually lose their abilities, given that they will most probably never be able to manifest them
again (Stanley and Williamson 2001, 416; Stanley 2011, 128). We ﬁnd this misleading, though. We
could imagine, for instance, a situation where not only all pianos in the world would be destroyed, but
also all piano builders together with all the knowledge of how to build a piano. Just like the unfortunate
pianist would be modally far away from the possibility of playing the piano after losing her hands, so
would be any pianist in this imagined world where no more pianos will ever be available again. Never-
theless, we hold that both sorts of pianists would still keep their abilities in the relevant sense—viz., they
would both still be able to manifest their abilities if the conditions were recovered (no matter how mod-
ally far away that possibility is). Our point is that this modal distance with respect to opportunity ‘can’ is
of a different nature than the impossibility manifested in the Alzheimer’s case. If we could envisage new
manifestation opportunities for our chef in CHEF-B, they would certainly involve a completely new learn-
ing process for her, which means that the innermost ability itself would have been lost and ought to be
recovered—and so would be, we claim, her know-how.
26 For related discussion on this general point, see Sosa (2010, 466).
27 Having arthritis, having one’s hand’s amputated, being incarcerated, or being under water, are not cir-
cumstances where agents are expected to be able to manifest their abilities. Therefore, the fact that agents
ﬁnd themselves in those unfortunate circumstances—no matter how difﬁcult or even impossible it is for
them to get out of them—should not be considered as a disabling condition, in the sense that interests us.
On the contrary, what really matters is the agent’s capacity to succeed in the right circumstances—a
point that, as Hawley (2003) has insightfully shown, should be considered as a common ground for all
contenders in this debate.
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What counts as the ‘right circumstances’ is a complex issue.28 By the same token, (as
we’ll see) the sort of disabling conditions that are of interest for us, in so far as they
function as knowledge defeaters, may affect an agent in very different ways. In order to
sharpen these points, it will be helpful to review Ernest Sosa’s (e.g., 2015) ‘triple S’
analysis of competences:29
Competences are a special case of dispositions, that in which the host is disposed to suc-
ceed when she tries, or that in which the host seats a relevant skill, and is in the proper
shape and situation, such that she tries in close enough worlds, and in the close enough
worlds where she tries, she reliably enough succeeds. But this must be so in the right
way (2015, 23).
There is no doubt that pianists with no piano available, chefs fresh out of ingredients,
and golfers in Antarctica are not in the proper situation to manifest their abilities, but
those who are amputated or have arthritis cannot manifest them because they are not—in
Sosa’s parlance—in proper shape. Nevertheless, it may be argued that all of them pre-
serve the relevant skill provided it’s true that, if they were in proper shape and the right
situation, they would be able to manifest that skill reliably enough, something that would
not be true of unfortunate CHEF-B, who would have lost even the seat of her skill. As
Sosa (2015) puts it:
Drop the situation and you still have an inner SS competence. Drop both shape and situa-
tion and you still have an innermost S competence: that is, the basic driving skill retained
even when asleep (in unfortunate shape) in bed (in an inappropriate situation) (2015, 26).
The limits between skill, shape and situation are anything but clear, and philosophers of
mind and cognitive science working on situated cognition might have valuable input
here.30 Perhaps the skill is extended to the limbs of the agent (embodiment),31 or perhaps
some aspects of the situation are part of the agent’s cognitive system (extended cogni-
tion),32 but in any case, the following is clear enough: attributions of abilities or compe-
tences are always made with the idea of right circumstances of manifestation in mind,
where SSS conditions are met.
Let’s now reﬁne things further in order to meet our second desideratum, which was to
ﬁnd (roughly) analogous features to justiﬁcation and truth that can feature as aspects of
the ability that are defeated in cases of know-how. Recall that, on the propositional
model canvassed in §1, knowledge-that could be defeated in either an undercutting or
rebutting manner, depending on whether it is the justiﬁcation of the belief or its truth that
the defeater calls into doubt. It verges on a category mistake to talk about the ‘justiﬁca-
tion’ of an ability, which is not a propositional state, and much less about its ‘truth’,
28 For a recent discussion of this point, as concerns the exercise of cognitive abilities in (propositional)
knowledge acquisition, see Greco (2012).
29 A similar application of Sosa’s distinction may be found in Tsai (2011) and Kotzee (2016).
30 See, for example, Wilson and Foglia (2016) for an overview.
31 See No€e (2005) for similar claims.
32 For the classic defence of this view, see Clark and Chalmers (1998). Cf., Carter and Czarnecki (2015)
for a limited defence of extended abilities, as relevant to knowledge-how on an anti-intellectualist con-
strual.
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since abilities are not representational states with propositional contents. In this respect, a
natural question becomes: is there some feature (or features) of abilities that may help
support a distinction analogous to undercutting versus rebutting modes of defeat in an
anti-intellectualist epistemology of knowledge-how?
It seems as though the answer could be ‘yes’ provided there are also relevantly differ-
ent fashions in which one’s abilities could be defeated. To a ﬁrst approximation, this will
be by the imperilling of each one of the aspects of the standard conditions where the
agent is expected to manifest the ability, that is, each of its SSS components. In other
words: the ability to φ is genuinely defeated only when, even if the agent were in the rel-
evant situation, in the right shape, and in her own seat, she would be not able anymore
to φ reliably enough if she tried.
Against this background, and with Sosa’s categories in mind, we are in a position
now to offer some illustrative cases of the types of disability that produce epistemic
defeat. These cases will be—like the ones where propositional knowledge is defeated—
situations where an agent has some epistemic state (viz., knowledge) that is downgraded
up to the point that it no longer qualiﬁes as knowledge. In other words: we are targeting
situations where an agent that previously knew how to φ is such that she does not know
anymore how to φ.
These situations arise, we hold, as an effect of some mismatch between the agent’s pow-
ers and the relevant SSS conditions where those powers are expected to be manifested.
And we submit that such a mismatch may be produced in at least three different ways.
(i) First, it could be that the agent is not able anymore to φ in a given situation (or range
of situations) that is, or has become, the relevant one for her to φ.
(ii) Second, it could be that the agent is not able anymore to φ in a given shape that is,
or has become, the relevant one for her to φ.
(iii) Third, it could be that, even if we hold ﬁxed that the situation and the shape she is
in are the same as when the agent was able to φ, she can no longer φ because she
has lost the very seat of her skill.
We will discuss these three possibilities in what follows.
4.1 Situational defeaters
An agent’s knowledge-how is defeated by a situational defeater when the agent previ-
ously knew how to φ, but she does not know anymore due to a change in the situation
that is relevant to the assessment of her abilities. Note that the situational defeat of one’s
knowledge-how is compatible with the agent retaining her ability to perform in some pre-
vious circumstances, those that supported the original know-how attribution. It is just that
those circumstances are no longer relevant to whether she counts as knowing how to do
the activity in question.
Consider the following case:
OBSOLETE BROKER: Laura has been an excellent stock broker for twenty years, during the
‘70s and ‘80s. She helped her clients earn a lot of money in those years, as did she her-
self. Unfortunately for Laura, the rise of new technologies has caused the job to become
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very different from what it was. Everything relies now on complex computerized systems
that Laura is unable to master. Overwhelmed by the mechanisms of high-tech trading,
she ﬁnds herself unable to competently assess ﬁnancial risk. Progressively, Laura’s once
satisﬁed clients abandon her, complaining that she does not know anymore how to make
money for them.
In this case, the natural description of the scene is one in which Laura used to know-how to
make money in the stock market, but doesn’t anymore. We grant that if the know-obsolete
technology of the ‘70s and ‘80s, which can no longer be used to effectively manage ﬁnan-
cial risk assessment, was currently relevant to making money in the stock market, then
Laura would still know how to make money in the stock market. But it’s not, and so she
doesn’t. An unfortunate change in the situation defeats her knowledge, and her state is
downgraded in epistemic status. OBSOLETE BROKER features then a case of what we will call
a situational stative defeater, in accordance with an anti-intellectualist understanding of
know-how. It is anti-intellectualist because it is the agent’s new lack of ability is what
explains the defeat of her knowledge, rather than the acquisition of some new propositional
state related to her justiﬁcation. It is stative (in contrast to normative) because the relevant
situation changes as a matter of fact, and not because of a change in the normative regula-
tion. And it is situational because the new conditions affect the external aspect of the SSS
conditions where the agent would be expected to succeed if she knew how.
Consider now a similar case where defeat is due to changes in the normative context:
OBSOLETE GYMNAST: Ebba is a very successful gymnast who has won several Olympic
medals on the vaulting table. In particular, her speciality is the extremely complex and
demanding stunt E, which she has mastered to perfection. One day, the Olympic commit-
tee issued a surprise announcement. Due to evidence that certain aspects of gymnasts
technique on the vaulting table have been linked to spinal cord trauma, these aspects have
now been banned in competition. They were, however, crucial in Ebba’s exceptional per-
formance of E. With the new rules in play, Ebba is signiﬁcantly limited in what she can
accomplish on the vaulting table, and in particular, she does not know anymore how to
ﬁnish stunt E correctly (i.e., in accordance with the rules).
In OBSOLETE GYMNAST, what changes are the normative standards for success, which deﬁne a
canon for the activity in question, establishing its model of correctness. If it is the ability itself
that is so deﬁned, then (for example) Ebba’s new situation in OBSOLETE GYMNAST should be
described as one where she no longer has the ability to do perform jump E. And, as an effect
of this failure in her ability, it is no longer the case that she knows how to do jump E.
We hold that this case thus features a normative situational defeater for knowledge-how,
conceived along anti-intellectualist lines. It is normative because, in light of the change in
the constitutive norms that govern what counts as a valid way of E-ing, Ebba should not
perform the act anymore the way she used to—in the sense of ‘should’ that features in the
claim that the chess player should not move her knight three spaces forward.33 Note that
33 Our case of Ebba is one where—according to Searle’s distinction (1969)—the activity is not merely regu-
lated by norms, but even more, the norms are constitutive of the activity itself. A question may be raised
as to whether normative situational defeaters might also feature in cases where the normative standards
that shift are regulative, rather than constitutive, of the activity in question. We believe that they do. For
instance: a change in regulative norms concerning ﬁshing, which most authors consider as an activity reg-
ulated by rules but not constituted by them, may have the effect that some agent in particular does not
know anymore how to ﬁsh according to the new normative context.
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even if Ebba were stubborn and proceeded in her familiar method, her performance would
not count as stunt E anymore, and she would thus not succeed in her attempt to do it.
(Continuing the chess analogy: if one does not move in accordance with the rules of cas-
tling, one has not castled, but has rather done something else, or nothing valid at all).
Finally, the normative situational defeater described is thoroughly anti-intellectualist
because what actually produces the defeat is not some change in Ebba’s propositional atti-
tudes. Rather, what produces the defeat in this case is a change in the standards that deﬁne
the ability itself.
It will be helpful here to quickly raise and reply to two anticipated objections. The
ﬁrst of them proceeds as follows: our diagnosis of Ebba’s situation conﬂates distinct abil-
ities in the service of illustrating what we’re calling a normative situation defeater. Call
E1 the ability Ebba had mastered before the new regulations, and E2 the ability she is
required to perform once the regulations change. E1 and E2 are simply not, according to
this objection, the same ability, and thus, Ebba’s knowledge-how was not, as we are sug-
gesting, defeated, but rather, a different kind of know-how is now required from her: one
that she does not have, but of whose ignorance is compatible with the know-how she still
retains—viz., to perform the E1 stunt. Or so this objection goes.
We think such an interpretation should be resisted. On closer inspection, the objection
has considerable baggage: a revisionary way of thinking about abilities that conﬂicts with
our ordinary attribution patterns. It is hard to deny that, both when the relevant facts
about the situation change, or when the standards for regulated activities change, we very
naturally deny knowledge-how to agents who are unable to act according to the new con-
ditions and/or regulations, and we do not insist that agents still do know-how to perform
them. Unless the agent is actually able to perform in accordance to the new conditions or
rules, the inclination is to say that she does not know how to do it anymore. To the
extent that this is right, the observation that E1 and E2 can be conceived of as distinct
abilities—something we do not deny—doesn’t go very far toward undermining the
thought that Laura or Ebba used to know how to succeed in the previous conditions, but
now do not know anymore.
The second objection would consist in claiming that what Laura and Ebba lack is sim-
ilar to what our CHEF-A lacked, i.e. the mere opportunity to manifest their abilities, and
not the abilities themselves. If that alternative diagnosis were right, our cases would not
be featuring situations of genuine epistemic defeat, for the very same reasons that we had
claimed that CHEF-A did not feature a genuine case of epistemic defeat—i.e. new condi-
tions do not undermine the ability itself, but consist in a mere lack of opportunity to
manifest it. However, we also have a principled reply to this objection. In our view, there
is some feature common to Laura’s and Ebba’s new context that is lacking from CHEF-A’s
one, namely: CHEF-A may not be properly required to perform in his new conditions, and
shall not be sensibly expected to do so. It would be unfair to ask chefs in general to per-
form the physical activities required by cooking when affected by severe arthritis. Never-
theless, the factual or normative changes affecting Laura and Ebba are such that they are
both fairly required to, and expected to, succeed in these new conditions, if they want to
preserve their status of knowledgable agents. Unless they had the ability to succeed in
their respective new conditions, we would not be allowed to claim anymore that they
know how to do it. In contrast to CHEF-A, OBSOLETE BROKER and OBSOLETE GYMNAST are
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situations where the opportunity for manifesting the ability is not simply lacking: the rel-
evant opportunity is there, it is just that those agents are not up to it anymore.34
Two ﬁnal points about our cases of situational defeaters are relevant to note. Firstly,
what is imperilled in both cases is the ability itself, viz., the ability to succeed under rele-
vant circumstances. In both OBSOLETE GYMNAST as well as OBSOLETE BROKER, nothing inter-
nal to the agent changes—that is that is perhaps the problem!—but their capacities
become ineffective, and they lose their powers rather than—as per intellectualism—losing
epistemic status vis-a-vis some representational attitude(s).
Secondly note that even if our two cases share the idea that the change is in the relevant
external context, that is, in the situation, they are different in an interesting respect: the way
the case is described, Laura’s problem is not normative in the sense that Ebba’s is. What’s
problematic for Laura is (in short) the way things are, or the way they are not anymore.
However, Ebba’s situation in OBSOLETE GYMNAST has to do with how the task is deﬁned
according to some normative standards. It has to do with changes in what she should or
shouldn’t do, in what is allowed or forbidden, in order to that performance to count as
acceptable, or valuable. For that reason, we hold that situational defeaters for know-how
may be stative or normative, depending on whether what changes in the situation is the
way things actually are, or the normative context the action ought to conform to.
4.2 Shape defeaters
An agent’s knowledge-how is defeated by a shape defeater when the agent previously
knew how to φ, but the agent does not know anymore due to a change in the agent’s
shape that is relevant to the assessment of her abilities. In such cases, the crux of the
problem is a mismatch between the agent’s capacities to perform and the relevant shape
in which she is expected to succeed—viz., that she is no longer able to successfully φ in
a shape in which she is now expected to do. Note that, just as with situational defeaters,
the defeat of one’s knowledge-how via a shape defeater is compatible with the agent
retaining her ability to perform in some previous shape(s), those that supported the origi-
nal know-how attribution. It is just that such shape(s) are no longer relevant to whether
she counts as knowing how to do the activity in question, because she is now unable to
do it in a shape that has become central for the new SSS conditions.
As we did for situational defeaters in §4.1, we will introduce two cases that respec-
tively feature stative and normative shape defeaters:
WRECKED GYMNAST: Viggo is a very promising gymnast, who has always idolised the
legendary Viktor, the most famous gymnast in their country’s history. Viktor learned
about Viggo’s exceptional potential from their common trainer, and became jealous. After
watching Viggo perform stunt V, Viktor makes a devastating—though completely unfair
—criticism of Viggo’s performance. Seriously affected by his idol’s verdict, Viggo
becomes very nervous whenever he thinks that Victor is watching him, which he expects
34 In contrast to our two obsolete cases, we could imagine others that would be relevantly similar to CHEF-A,
and thus feature cases of lack opportunity. For instance: our broker could have lost her client’s conﬁ-
dence due to some affair not related to her competence in such a way that nobody would ask her any-
more for her services. Or the whole national delegation the gymnast belongs to could have been banned
from competition. These would be properly considered as lacks of opportunity, but not as cases of epis-
temic defeat. Stokes brokers may not be asked to perform their job deprived of all sources of funding,
and gymnasts are not expected to succeed in competitions where they are not allowed to participate.
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to happen just in any important competition. If he suspects Victor is watching him when
he is about to perform stunt V, he confuses, and can’t remember, the steps required to
execute the stung; consequently, he miserably fails, or (at least) performs very poorly.
DOPED CHESS PLAYER: Vladimir is an excellent chess player who has always used a certain sub-
stance—Adderall—that his trainer recommended before his matches to help control for his
ADHD. Adderall helped him concentrate very well, and to master the complex Ruy Lopez
opening, including many of the nuanced variations on this opening (his skilful execution of
the Ruy Lopez involved anticipating up to 15 to 20 moves ahead). Vladimir, through his use
of the Ruy Lopez opening, became a successful tournament player. Once the World Chess
Federation came to view Adderall as an unfair form of cognitive enhancement, the substance
was prohibited; subsequently, Vladimir (absent the Adderall) is unable to concentrate long
enough to execute the Ruy Lopez effectively in competition. In fact, he is convinced that he
does not know anymore how to Ruy Lopez, if he is not allowed to have his drug.
As was the case with situational defeaters, our cases of shape defeaters might be con-
tested on the alleged grounds that Viggo and Vladimir still do know how to perform in
some set of SSS conditions: their performance has just been compromised when they are
in some particular shape.
However, our reply to this suggestion is consonant with our reply to the analogous form
of objection canvassed in §4.1. In short, the shapes in which they are not able to perform
anymore are the relevant ones, whereas the shapes in which they are still able to perform
are not. As an effect of his new psychological shape, Viggo cannot perform well anymore
in any important competition—given that the thought that Viktor is observing makes him
too nervous—and Vladimir can only manage the focus required to successfully execute the
Ruy Lopez if he is in a state—under the effect of a Adderall—that is now prohibited in
competition. Therefore, in so far as Viggo and Vladimir would succeed, respectively only
in shapes that have become irrelevant, they do not know anymore how to perform.
In the WRECKED GYMNAST case, the problem is a positive (stative) change in the sense
that what has changed has nothing to do with regulations and norms, but just with the
state the agent is now, as a matter of fact. However, in DOPED CHESS PLAYER we ﬁnd a
change in regulations and norms as the debilitating factor that had a deleterious effect on
Vladimir’s powers. The shape Vladimir would be able to succeed has simply become
irrelevant, due to the fact that being in that shape is forbidden.
4.3 Seat defeaters
An agent’s knowledge-how is defeated by a seat defeater when the agent previously
knew how to φ, but she does not know anymore due to a change in the agent’s seat that
is relevant to the assessment of her ability to φ. In such cases, even if we hold ﬁxed that
the relevant external situation and the relevant shape she is in are just the same as when
the agent was able to φ, she can no longer φ because she has lost the very seat of her
skill. Seat defeaters, in short, undermine the innermost seat of the agent’s competences.
Consider the following two cases, the ﬁrst—featuring former New York Yankees sec-
ond baseman Chuck Knoblauch—is due to Hubert Dreyfus (2007). The second, concern-
ing a rare loss of synaesthesia in an artist due to brain trauma, is taken from a study
reported by Sacks et al. (1988).
ABSORBED BASEMAN: [. . .] Knoblauch was. . . voted best inﬁelder of the year, but one day,
rather than simply ﬁelding a hit and throwing the ball to ﬁrst base, it seems he stepped
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back and took up a ‘free, distanced orientation’ towards the ball and how he was throw-
ing it—the mechanics of it, as he put it. After that, he couldn’t recover his former absorp-
tion and often—though not always—threw the ball to ﬁrst base erratically—once into the
face of a spectator (Dreyfus, 2007, 354).
SYNAESTHESIA ARTIST: A patient, ‘Mr. I.’ was a successful artist, with a specialty in paint-
ing. Mr. I’s artistic skills were enhanced through his intense synaesthesia, which allowed
him to experience musical notes as colours. At the age of 65, he was in an automobile
accident after which he acquired cerebral achromatopsia, or colour-blindedness, and with
the colourblindedness, he lost his synaesthesia and his abilities to paint.
One might initially suggest that ABSORBED BASEMAN and SYNAESTHESIA ARTIST feature what
we called shape defeaters in §4.2, as were illustrated in the cases WRECKED GYMNAST and
DOPED CHESS PLAYER. We maintain however that ABSORBED BASEMAN and SYNAESTHESIA
ARTIST are importantly different from the cases featuring shape defeaters: in these cases,
the problem is not that the agents are in a state that is transitory, a state they may get in
or out of. Rather what transpires is a radical change in the way they are.
Consider, brieﬂy, an example Sosa (2015, 96) offers in the case of the seat of one’s abil-
ity to drive a car. This is, as he puts it, the ‘innermost’ competence—viz., the ‘structural seat
in one’s brain, nervous system, and body, which the driver retains even while asleep or
drunk’. The seat, so understood, remains intact throughout changes in shape. The changes
to Knoblauch’s and Mr. I’s mental lives are fundamental ones, not like being asleep, or
drunk; what has happened to each is held ﬁxed as the shape each is in can ﬂuctuate.
In the case of SYNAESTHESIA ARTIST, the cause of seat change is an injury-induced
pathology, whereas ABSORBED BASEMAN features something that is curiously psychological
—viz., what is colloquially termed the ‘yips’. The underlying causes of the yips, which
have in many cases been career-ending for competitive athletes,35 continues to be studied
and debated by sports psychologists.36
At this point, it will be helpful to take stock of our taxonomy of defeaters for know-
how, with reference to the cases discussed thus far.37
Note that whereas we have introduced normative (along with stative) defeaters in both
§4.1 and §4.2 for situation and shape, respectively, we submit that there is a principled
35 This yips have been career ending for baseball players (along with Knoblauch) such as Steve Sax, Rick
Ankiel, Steve Blass and Mickey Sasser.
36 For example, in a study by Stinear et al. (2006), the phenomenon of the yips in golf has been argued to
admit of two subtypes, based on symptoms reported. One kind of yips, ‘Type 1’, involves primarily
reported movement-related symptoms, whereas another type (Type 2) involves primarily anxiety-related
symptoms. For related discussion, see Papineau (2015).
37 see, however, the FORBIDDEN CYBORG case in fn. 38.
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reason why the seat of a competence is immune to normative defeat. Norms regulate
social and public performances, which accounts for why the characters in OBSOLETE GYM-
NAST and DOPED CHESS PLAYER fail to know how to perform their respective activities in
the relevant SSS conditions; what counted as the relevant situation and shape in those
respective cases changed due to socially, publically, politically, etc. sanctioned changes.
It is unclear to us that such normative changes may forbid the innermost seat of one’s
competence and still feature as genuine cases of epistemic defeat.38
4.4 Inhabilitating vs. Downgrading Defeat
Within each of the categories taxonomised in our chart in §4.3, we can introduce two
modes, corresponding with inhabilitating and downgrading defeat. In the former case, as
an effect of the epistemic defeater, the agent simply loses the ability to φ, whereas in the
latter case, the agent is still able to perform the activity in question in the new SSS rele-
vant combination, but not to the same standards of excellence.
In certain simple cases, there is no clear need for such a distinction. For example,
there is little room for gradable mastery in opening a door: once one is able to success-
fully open a door, one will typically thereby know how to open a door as well as any-
one, as well as it’s possible to know how to do it. But the interesting cases for a
promising epistemology of know-how, we think, are those where agents are expected to
meet standards that have a certain complexity, and attain some form of success that may
be qualiﬁed as mastery beyond mere success.
38 If anything like a normative seat defeater for know-how were conceivable, it would have to be a situation
where an agent would be unable to φ (or to φ as well as she used to) due to some normative change that
forbids the qualities of her innermost seat: it should not be a normative change that merely affects the
situation where the agent used to manifest the ability, nor a change that merely forbids the shape the
agent used to be in when performing, but a new norm that actually forbids, in short, who the agent actu-
ally is, the permanent and innermost seat of her skill. The closest we can come to imagining such a sce-
nario is the following:
FORBIDDEN CYBORG: Imagine that we live in a society inhabited by both humans and cyborgs, where the
latter had been cognitively enhanced via some chips so deeply integrated in the cyborg cognitive archi-
tecture that their very existence depends on them. The state of the chips, indispensable to the cyborgs as
our (for instance) brain is to us, constitutes part of the seat of their competences to engage in intelligent
behaviour, e.g., to play chess, and not merely what shapes they are in. Put another way, these chips,
which permit the cyborgs to play remarkably skilled chess, are not analogous to drugs, which engender
a transitory state, but to the cyborg’s baseline brain state. That said, imagine some change of regulations
in that society according to which cyborgs would, in virtue of the chip—discovered to have amazing
beneﬁts in chess—no longer allowed to lay in chess tournaments.
In such a case, it would seem as though the cyborg’s previous knowledge might be defeated by a normative
seat defeater: they would allegedly not know how to play chess anymore because they would be forbidden
from exercising their innermost competence to play it. Our intuition, however, is that the right diagnosis of
FORBIDDEN CYBORG is as follows: that cyborgs do still know how to play chess, only that they have been
banned from being in the right opportunity to manifest that ability. Vladimir’s situation is completely differ-
ent in this respect, since he would be unable to play in the relevant shape, but nonetheless permitted to do
so. We may reasonably require Vladimir to play well not being under the effects of the drug, but we may
not reasonably require the cyborg to play well while not being a cyborg. Such a requirement is arguably
incoherent. In sum, the above putative case of a normative seat defeater would then be better described as a
situation where the agent is precluded, for normative reasons, from having the opportunity to manifest her
abilities. We remain open though to the possibility that there be other cases we have not been able to imag-
ine that featured that kind of case.
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Consider that there is an important difference between having the ability to play foot-
ball and knowing how to play it (well), as there is a difference between being able to run
a company and knowing how to run it (well), or being able to address a large audience and
knowing how to do it (well). In each of these cases, the ﬂat-out attribution of know how
points to a more valuable state than just the capacity to attain minimal success. The know-
how is more valuable, but not necessarily different in essence from the capacity. The valu-
able know-how in such complex cases reﬂects a certain level of mastery of that capacity.
With these points in mind, it should be clear now why (at least, within the kind of
anti-intellectualist programme we’re pursuing) defeaters for know-how will not be exclu-
sively inhabilitating; they might also downgrade the agents’ knowledge-how to φ in a
manner such that the ability to achieve minimal success at φ-ing is preserved, though its
exercise is less valuable, less masterful, than before.39
That knowledge-how will be defeasible in a downgrading mode, and not only in a
inhabilitating one, should be expected; just as the concept of know-how is gradable,40 so
should we expect that the possible defeasibility conditions of know-how could in some
way reﬂect this. Thus, for the available static and normative varieties of situation, shape
and seat defeaters, we may distinguish between inhabilitating and downgrading modes.
In other words: each of our agents in those cases may become simply unable to perform
at all once the defeater appears, which would make them cases of inhabilitating defeaters;
or they may be unable to perform as well as they did before, which explains why they
do not know how to do it as well as they did before the appearance of the defeater. In
that latter case, the examples would feature situations of downgrading defeaters, which
have as an effect a certain loss in the ﬁnal value of the agent’s attainments.41
One ﬁnal point is of relevance here: it is common ground that traditional epistemic
defeaters for knowledge-that may themselves be defeated. The acquisition of new infor-
mation may defeat an agent’s rebutting or undercutting defeater, upgrading her cognitive
state back to the level of knowledge-that. The same thing may happen, we hold, in the
case of epistemic defeaters for knowledge-how, across all the categories proposed. For
instance, in OBSOLETE BROKER the arousal of user-friendlier technologies could potentially
help Laura deal with the new conditions of the stock market, allowing her to recover her
39 See Carter & Pritchard (2015c) for discussion of the value of knowledge-how in comparison with the
value of knowledge-that.
40 For an excellent discussion of the gradability of know-how, see Pavese, forthcoming.
41 A reviewer at Philosophy and Phenomenological Research has expressed the concern that states such as
desires could also be ‘defeated’ in a sense similar to the one we propose here, however, such defeat
would be on closer inspection orthogonal to epistemic defeasibility. For instance: changing facts and
norms may debilitate conative states such as desires, perhaps entirely. However, we doubt that such a
phenomenon has the characteristics we explore here with respect to knowledge-how. In particular, desires
do not seem to have the normative character and value that we confer on knowledge states, and which
justiﬁes in our view that epistemic defeasibility for knowledge-how may be stative or normative, as well
as inhabilitating or downgrading. We may say, for instance, that an agent does not know how to φ after
some changes in the norms that constitute or regulate the activity in question, as happens in OBSOLETE
BROKER or OBSOLETE GYMNAST; but a similar normative change would not immediately justify the ‘defeat’
of a desire, which may be simply preserved (both in its phenomenal character and its motivational
strength) in the agent’s mind, despite those normative changes. We ﬁnd this difference important: some
object becoming forbidden does not imply that it is not desired, but some way of φ-ing becoming forbid-
den may imply that the agent does not know how to φ anymore (and is thus inhabilitated), or does not
know how to φ as well as she used to anymore (and is thus downgraded in her ability). Knowledge-how
states are then conferred on—or denied to—agents as a result of a normative and social practice of epis-
temic evaluation in ways that are structurally very different from desires.
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previous capacities; in OBSOLETE GYMNAST, likewise, a new change in the regulations may
allow Ebba to perform stunt E in a way that manifests excellence; and so on. Given that
those new facts or norms have the consequence that agents recover the capacity to per-
form in the relevant SSS conditions according to their previous standards of excellence,
they function as defeaters of the previous defeaters.42 Fortunately, not all defeasibility
has to be as deﬁnitive and irretrievable as the one we encounter in CHEF-B.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown, ﬁrst, that the intellectualist account of knowledge-how (as
described in §1) has a problem with epistemic defeat across its main modalities (psychologi-
cal vs. normative and undercutting vs. rebutting). If intellectualism were correct, and knowl-
edge-how were a species of knowledge-that, we should expect that the same mechanisms of
defeat that undermine propositional knowledge would undermine knowledge-how. But that
is not the case, as we have shown in §2, with different variations on GRENADE FACTORY. Sec-
ond, we have ﬁlled a lacuna in the existing literature by showing in §3 how an anti-intellectu-
alist account of knowledge-how may have a positive answer to the issue of how knowledge-
how stands subject to epistemic defeat. An understanding of knowledge-how centred around
abilities rather than propositional attitudes may account for different situations where know-
how seems to be genuinely defeated, a problem that we have faced via appeal to Sosa’s SSS
account. In this sense, we have shown that there are situation defeaters (both normative and
stative), shape defeaters (again, normative and stative), and seat defeaters (in this case, stative
but not normative), and that each of these categories may either inhabilitate or downgrade the
agent’s know-how, as we have shown in §4.43 In contrast to what the intellectualist would
hold, we have shown that in each of these situations, the reason why the knowledge-how is
defeated is different from the appearance of some new information that undercuts the agent’s
justiﬁcation for her beliefs, or that rebuts the truth of those beliefs. What makes a difference
though is that in each of those cases of genuine know-how defeasibility there is some new
feature, either of the agent’s practical environment, of his transitory shape, or of the inner-
most seat of his skill, that actually imperils agent’s capacities, preventing them from being
manifested in the set of the relevant circumstances where she is expected to succeed.44 It
42 Thanks to a referee at Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for prompting discussion on this
point.
43 One issue we have not taken a stand on in this paper is a metaphysical one; namely, whether states of
know-how just are abilities (so that to defeat S’s ability to φ just is to defeat S’s knowledge how to φ
because these are one and the same state of S), or whether they are distinct states which entails the pos-
session of these abilities (so that if one defeats S’s ability to φ one defeats S’s knowledge how to φ
because, necessarily, one can know how to φ only if one possesses the ability to φ). As we see it, we
needn’t commit here (in light of our dialectical aim) on this metaphysical point, though it is an interesting
and important one for an overall anti-intellectualist analysis of knowledge-how to address. The authors
have recently elsewhere (i.e., Carter & Navarro 2017) developed such an analysis which commits to, and
defends, the second of the two foregoing interpretations, though we think it goes beyond what we can do
to present this view here. Thanks to an anonymous referee at Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research for querying this point.
44 The authors would like to thank Modesto Gomez Alonso, Emma C. Gordon, Josh Habgood Coote and
Pablo Rey Blanco for helpful discussion and two anonymous referees at Philosophy and Phenomenologi-
cal Research for very useful comments on a previous version of this paper. Research for this paper was
supported by the Spanish MINECO (Ministerio de Economıa y Competitividad) via research Grants
FFI2014-51811-P and FFI2015-67569-C2-1-P, and by the V Plan Propio de Investigacion of the Univer-
sidad de Sevilla.
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remains to be explained how the particular phenomenon of epistemic defeasibility may be
integrated into a full-blown anti-intellectualist analysis of knowledge-how—a project the
authors are undertaking to develop in future work.
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